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OPINION*
______________
GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.
Ben McCormack and accomplices robbed three stores that sell guns. McCormack
later pleaded guilty to two federal offenses. Prior to sentencing, he objected to the
application of a four-level increase to his Offense Level pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
Guideline § 2K2.1(b)(5). The District Court purported to resolve McCormack’s
objection and found that the enhancement applied. However, when the District Court
resolved the objection, it cited to and quoted from U.S. Sentencing Guideline
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). Because we find that the District Court committed a procedural error,
we will vacate McCormack’s sentence and remand to the District Court for resentencing.
I.

Background
Ben McCormack and several accomplices stole nearly 100 weapons from three

businesses in Pennsylvania. McCormack sold many of the stolen firearms for cash. He
also contacted an individual known to law enforcement to be involved in drug trafficking
to arrange the sale of some of the firearms. A day after his third heist, McCormack was

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, does not
constitute binding precedent.
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arrested. His home and vehicle were searched. Burglary tools and stolen firearms from
three Federal Firearm Licensees (“FFLs”) were recovered.
On January 5, 2018, McCormack entered a plea of guilty to one count of
conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 371, to steal firearms from a FFL, and Possess and Receive
Stolen Firearms Shipped in Interstate Commerce, 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), (u) (Count 1); and
one count of Theft of Firearms From a FFL, 18 U.S.C. § 922(u) (Count 2).
The U.S. Probation Office prepared a Presentence Investigation Report (“PSR”) in
which it calculated McCormack’s Total Offense Level as thirty-five. This was based on
a Base Offense Level of twenty-two, a four-level increase pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(5); a
four-level increase pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B); and two other increases. McCormack
objected to the application of the enhancement pursuant to § 2K2.1(b)(5), arguing that
there was nothing in the record supporting application of the enhancement. The
Probation Office, nevertheless, maintained its position that § 2K2.1(b)(5) applied, issuing
a revised PSR with a Total Offense Level of thirty-four.1
In a Sentencing Memorandum submitted to the District Court, McCormack
objected to the application of § 2K2.1(b)(5) for the trafficking of firearms, claiming that
nothing “in the signed and filed plea agreement, the Government’s Memorandum of
Offense Conduct . . . , and the statement of offense conduct read into the record at the
change of plea hearing on January 5, 2018,” supported the application of the

When calculating McCormack’s offense level in the revised PSR, the Probation Office
applied a provision of § 2K2.1 that limits the cumulative offense level from the
application of subsections § 2K2.1(b)(1) through (b)(4) to twenty-nine. The Probation
Office did not apply this provision when it prepared McCormack’s first PSR.
1
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enhancement. Sentencing Memorandum 6. More specifically, McCormack argued that
while the Government may have known that one of the individuals he sold firearms to
was a drug trafficker, McCormack did not know or have reason to believe that that
individual’s possession of the guns would be unlawful or that he would dispose of them
unlawfully.
McCormack appeared for sentencing in the District Court, and the parties argued
the applicability of § 2K2.1(b)(5). McCormack’s counsel argued that based on the record
before the Court, the Government failed to meet its burden of showing that McCormack
“knew or had reason to believe that the conduct would result in the transport or disposal
of firearms to an individual whose possession would be unlawful.” J.A. 71. The
Government responded with facts it believed supported the application of the
enhancement including: (1) a reference within the Revised PSR to the transfer of guns to
an individual known to the government to be involved with drug trafficking,
(2) McCormack’s meeting with an intermediary to arrange the transfer of firearms,
(3) McCormack’s transfer of guns to one of his accomplices as payment,
(4) McCormack’s knowledge, based on his own criminal history, that the individuals
receiving the weapons would be in receipt of and possession of stolen property, and
(5) the number of transferred firearms. The Government summed up by arguing that the
“ultimate recipients” of the weapons “were individuals who were involved in criminal
activity.” J.A. 71–72.
The District Court overruled McCormack’s objection and found that § 2K2.1(b)(5)
applied. The District Court stated:
4

United States Sentencing Guideline 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) prescribes
a four-level enhancement if the defendant, quote, possessed or
transferred any firearm or ammunition with knowledge, intent
or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in
connection with another felony offense, end quote.
The record here supports the application of this enhancement,
including the quantity of stolen firearms sold, multiple sales to
the same individual, and that this individual has been known to
engage in drug trafficking.
So I have now resolved all objections to the presentence report.
J.A. 72.
The District Court determined that McCormack had a Total Offense Level of
thirty and a Criminal History Category of III, which resulted in a Sentencing Guidelines
Advisory Range of 121 to 151 months of imprisonment. The District Court sentenced
McCormack to a term of imprisonment of 121 months. This timely appeal followed.
II.

Discussion2
McCormack appeals the application of § 2K2.1(b)(5) on the same grounds he

raised in the District Court. Specifically, he contends that he “never admitted or even
suggested that he knew or had any reason to know that [the individuals he sold the stolen
firearms to] would use them to engage in unlawful activity.” Appellant’s Br. at 6. Thus,
with a record lacking evidence of McCormack’s “knowledge that [the firearms] would be
used illegally” the Government could not and did not meet its burden to prove that §
2K2.1(b)(5) applied. Id.

2

The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
5

Our review of a District Court’s sentence proceeds in two stages, and we apply an
abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). First, we
consider “whether the Court committed a significant procedural error, such as improperly
calculating the Guidelines range.” United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 386 (3d Cir.
2013). “If the district court has committed procedural error, ‘we will generally remand
the case for resentencing, without going any further.’” United States v. Freeman, 763
F.3d 322, 335 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 411 (3d Cir.
2012). Second, if the District Court’s sentence is procedurally sound, we “consider the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed . . . . tak[ing] into account the totality
of the circumstances, including the extent of any variance from the Guidelines range.”
Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
Here, the District Court committed procedural error. The District Court cited to
and quoted from § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), suggesting that it was addressing an objection to the
application of that enhancement. Compare J.A. 72, with U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2018). McCormack, of course, had not objected
to the application of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B), but had objected to the application of
§ 2K2.1(b)(5).
The District Court’s cursory analysis fails to clarify whether the reference to the
wrong enhancement was simply a mistake or if the Court had § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) in mind
when resolving McCormack’s objection. The facts that the District Court listed—the
quantity of firearms, multiple sales to one individual, and that an individual who received

6

the weapons was known to be a drug trafficker3—do not, without further explication by
the District Court, clarify whether the District Court was analyzing the application of
§ 2K2.1(b)(5) or § 2K2.1(b)(6). Section 2K2.1(b)(5) applies when, among other things,
the defendant “knew or had reason to believe that [his] conduct would result in the . . .
transfer . . . of a firearm to an individual . . . who intended to use or dispose of the firearm
unlawfully,” U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1 cmt. n.13(A)(ii), and
§ 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) applies when the defendant “transferred any firearm . . . with
knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or possessed in connection
with another felony offense.” Thus, the three-interrelated facts the District Court
mentioned could, with several inferences, support the conclusions that (1) McCormack
transferred the firearms to someone McCormack knew or had reason to believe was
involved in drug trafficking and intended to use the guns unlawfully, satisfying
§ 2K2.1(b)(5), or (2) that McCormack had knowledge that or reason to believe that
someone he transferred the weapons to would use them in connection with drug
trafficking felonies, satisfying § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). See, e.g., United States v. Cicirello, 301
F.3d 135, 141–3 (3d Cir. 2002) (considering the application of a prior version of

We note that the District Court’s statement regarding this individual does not resolve
McCormack’s objection. The basis of McCormack’s objection, in part, was that the
Government had not introduced sufficient evidence to prove that McCormack had the
requisite knowledge regarding this individual being involved with drug trafficking.
Simply stating that “this individual has been known to engage in drug trafficking” does
not address whether McCormack “knew or had reason to believe” that the individual was
engaged in drug trafficking. See U.S. Sent’g Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1 cmt.
n.13(A)(ii); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(B).
3
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§ 2K2.1(b)(6)); United States v. Asante, 782 F.3d 639, 646 (11th Cir. 2015) (considering
the application of § 2K2.1(b)(5)).
The record before us does not allow us to conclude that the District Court’s
reference to § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) “was merely inadvertent.” Appellee’s Letter Br. 1–2.
Ultimately, because we cannot discern whether the District Court addressed and resolved
the objection McCormack raised, we find that the District Court erred.
III.

Conclusion
As a result of the District Court’s procedural error, we will vacate McCormack’s

sentence and remand for resentencing.4

Although both parties urge us to reach the merits of McCormack’s appeal, we decline to
do so given the procedural error. See United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 152 (3d Cir.
2011) (“If we find procedural error at any step [of the sentencing process], we will
generally ‘remand the case for re-sentencing, without going any further.’”) (quoting
United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010)).
4
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